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in 
Plaintiff and Appellant Beiwei Li, Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Beizhong Li. deceased (R. at 9), respectfully submits the following brief in support of his 
appeal. Defendant GEICO Indemnity Company ("GE1CO") was dismissed by stipulation 
(R. at 97-98, 104-107), which dismissal has not been appealed. This left Enterprise Rent-A-
Car of Utah ("Enterprise") and Shuyu Zhang ("Zhang") as the sole defendants. By 
agreement, further recovery by the personal representative against Zhang is limited to the 
coverage, if any, Enterprise owes to Zhang. (R. at 120) Enterprise is thus the only defendant 
having a real interest in the outcome of this appeal. References to statutes will be to the Utah 
Code Annotated unless otherwise indicated. 
I. JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-
3(2)0). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Standards of Review. The common standards of review are set forth in 
Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918 (Utah 1997): 
[1] Appellate courts give "deference to the trial court's findings of 
fact, and we will not set them aside unless they find them to be 
clearly erroneous." Reliance Ins. Co. v. UtahDep'tfor Transp., 858 
P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993). ["Clearly Erroneous"] [2] Legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness and afforded no deference. 
Id. ["Correctness"]. [3] Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed 
for abuse of discretion in applying the law to the facts. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). ["Abuse of Discretion"]. (Bracketed text 
added.) 
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The October, 1999 issue of the Utah Bar Journal contains a detailed and 
scholarly review of the law of appellate review written by Judge Norman H. Jackson of the 
Court of Appeals of Utah (Utah Bar JournaL Volume 12, No. 8, pages 8 through 53). It 
brings current his previous treatise on the subject and is entitled "Utah Standards of 
Appellate Review - Revised." With citations from a complete review of Utah cases, it 
affirms the standards set out above. As the article points out, the limits of discretion vary 
according to the circumstance and subsidiary issues may each be reviewed under a separate 
standard of review. (Id., p. 26). Hereafter, the standards of review will be referred to as 
"Clearly Erroneous," "Correctness," and "Abuse of Discretion." 
B. Statement of Issues. 
1. Do §41-12a-301(2)(a) and §31A-22-314(1) require Enterprise to provide 
$25,000 liability coverage for the driver of its car secondary only to the liability coverage of 
American Commerce Insurance Company which is more than $25,000? 
a. Standard of Review: Correctness. 
b. Record: Motions, Memos, and Order at R.47 - 96 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
1. §41-12a-301(2)(a) which provides: 
(a) eveiy resident owner of a motor vehicle shall maintain 
owner's or operator's security in effect at any time that the 
motor vehicle is operated on a highway within the state; 
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§31A-22-314(l) which provides: 
(1) A rental company shall provide its renters with primary' 
coverage meeting the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a, 
Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and 
Operators Act, unless there is other valid or collectible 
insurance coverage, (italics added) 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant is the personal representative of Beizhong Li who died in an 
automobile accident while a passenger in a car rented from Enterprise and driven by Zhang. 
Zhang had $100,000 liability coverage through American Commerce Insurance Company 
("American"). Beizhong Li had $ 100,000 underinsured motorist coverage through GEICO. 
Settlement was made with American (R. at 49) and GEICO for the full coverage of each. 
Appellant and Enterprise brought cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of 
whether Enteiprise was liable for secondary liability coverage for Zhang in the amount of 
$25,000. The Honorable Timothy R. Hansen ruled that: 
the plain language of Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-314 does 
not require Enterprise to provide "secondary" or "excess" 
coverage when there is "other valid and collectible insurance". 
The Court rejects Plaintiffs interpretation of §31A-22-314(1) 
because it would require the Court to improperly add language 
to the statute. (R. at 96) 
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V. RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts were presented in Beiwei Li's Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Concerning Enterprise. (R. at 42 - 43) They 
were not controverted by Enterprise. (R. at 58-60) 
1. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Utah ("Enterprise") is a Utah 
corporation with offices in Salt Lake County, Utah. (Answer of Enterprise 1f2) (R. at 16) 
2. In July, 2001, both Beizhong Li ("Beizhong") and Zhang were living 
and working in Utah as employees of Iomega Corporation. (Rental Agreement attached to 
Complaint, Wyoming Accident Report attached hereto) (R. at 11-12, 52-55) 
3. On or about July 20, 2000, Beizhong rented a Ford Taurus from 
Enterprise in Clearfield, Utah under a Rental Agreement, a copy of which is attached to the 
Complaint. (Answer of Enterprise, [^4, Rental Agreement attached to Complaint) (R. at 11-
12, 16) 
4. The Rental Agreement explicitly authorized Zhang to be a driver and 
authorized the rental car to travel outside of Utah to Wyoming and Idaho. (Rental Agreement 
attached to Complaint) (R. at 11-12) 
5. On July 21, 2000, while Zhang was driving and Beizhong was a 
passenger in the rental car in Wyoming, they were involved in an automobile accident which 
proximately caused the death of Beizhong. (Wyoming Accident Report attached to 
memorandum) (R. at 52-55) 
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6. In his Complaint, plaintiff has alleged that both Zhang and John Doe 
negligently caused this accident. (Complaint) (R. at 1-14) 
7. At all times relevant to this matter, Enterprise was the owner of the 
rented Taurus. (Answer of Enterprise |^9) (R. at 17) 
8. Enterprise provides its own coverage for motor vehicle owner's security. 
(6/21/2002 letter from Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc., attached to memorandum) 
(R. at 50) 
9. Zhang had insurance through American Commerce Insurance Company 
which provides him liability coverage for this accident with a limit of $100,000. (5/30/2002 
letter from American Commerce Insurance Company attached hereto) (R. at 49) 
10. Beizhong had a contract of insurance with GEICO Indemnity Company 
which provides Utah underinsured motorist coverage for Shuyu's liability in this accident 
with a limit of $ 100,000. This policy also provides Utah uninsured motorist coverage for the 
liability of John Doe with a limit of $100,000. (GEICO Answer ffif 31 and 32) (R. at 25, 33) 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Beiwei Li contends that Enterprise is required to provide $25,000 of coverage 
for the liability of Zhang under §41-12a-301(2)(a). Because §31A-22-314(1) only excuses 
rental companies from providing its renters with "primary" coverage where other valid and 
collectible insurance is present, Enterprise remains liable for this $25,000 coverage but its 
liability is secondary to the $100,000 coverage by American. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: 
Although the Accident Occurred in Wyoming, 
Utah Law Applies 
This point was briefed in the trial court and was not opposed there. The 
trial court assumed Utah law applied. It is presented here primarily for the court's 
information. 
Utah law applies to this issue even though the accident occurred in 
Wyoming. In American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
927 P.2d 186 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the most significant 
relationship test as explained in Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, §188. A vehicle 
registered in Idaho to an Idaho resident, insured under a policy entered into in Idaho, and 
driven by an Idaho resident was involved in an accident in Utah. The issue was whether 
Idaho's financial responsibility laws applied or Utah's. The court decided Idaho had the 
most significant relationship to the incident and applied Idaho law. Wyoming follows a 
similar rule. See California Fire & Casualty Insurance Company v. Brinkman, 50 
F.Supp.2d 1157 (D. Wyo 1999). 
Apart from the most significant relationship test, Wyoming law indicates 
that its financial responsibility law does not apply to this case. In Wyoming, financial 
responsibility is tied to the registration and licensing of vehicles. Wyoming Statutes §31-
6 
9-401 et seq. Rental cars validly registered out of state and bearing out of state license 
plates are exempted from Wyoming registration and licensing laws. Wyoming Statutes 
§31-2-201(d)(xi). 
POINT TWO: 
41-12a-301(2)(A) Requires Enterprise to Provide 
$25,000 Coverage for the Liability of Zhang 
§41-12a-301(2)(a) requires Enterprise to maintain owner's and operator's 
security upon its vehicles. Under §41-12a-103(9) and §41-12a-407(2), an owner who 
does not purchase an insurance policy is required to provide the same coverages as an 
insurance policy is required to provide under §31 A-22-302. Such coverage includes at 
least $25,000 of liability coverage under §31A-22-304(l)(a). 
The required $25,000 liability coverage includes coverage for "any other 
person using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the 
named insured. . ." §31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(A). This provision requires Enterprise to 
provide the $25,000 liability coverage for Zhang even though he was not the renter. 
7 
POINT THREE: 
31A-22-314(l) Does Not Excuse Enterprise From 
Providing $25,000 Secondary Liability Coverage to Zhang 
There is a triplet of provisions addressing rental car company issues in Part 3, 
Motor Vehicle Insurance, of Title 31 A, Chapter 22. §31 A-22-311 provides definitions, §312 
has provisions concerning collision damage, and §314 requires a rental car company to 
provide its renters with primaiy coverage meeting the requirements of Title 41, Chapter 12a 
unless there is other valid or collectible insurance coverage. Beiwei Li acknowledges that 
there was other valid or collectible insurance and that it exceeded $25,000. 
The term "renter" in §314 is a defined term under §311(5). It means "any 
person or organization obtaining the use of a private passenger motor vehicle from a rental 
company under the terms of a rental agreement." This would seem to include Zhang even 
though he was not the person who signed the rental contract.. 
§31A-22-314(1) does not replace §41-12a-3 01 (2)(a) although there is overlap. 
The difference is the term "primary". §31 A-22-314(1) pertains to "primary" coverage while 
§41-12a-301(2)(a), §41-12a-103(9), and §41-12-407(2) simply require the coverages of 
§31A-22-302. §31A-22-302 does not reference §31 A-22-314(1). 
The terms "primary", "secondary", "excess", "contingent", and "prorated" are 
used but not defined with regard to various coverages described in Part 3, Motor Vehicle 
Insurance. §68-3-11 provides a rule of statutory construction for "technical words and 
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phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law". Not 
too surprisingly, they "are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate 
meaning or definition." 
This rule of construction should be supplemented by that found in Stale v. 
Germonto, 21003 Utah App 217 ff7, 73 P.3d 978: 
1f 7 In interpreting statutes, we first look to the plain language of 
the statute. See Travelers Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT 
App 221,]f 12, 51 P.3d 1288. In considering the plain language 
of a statute, courts" 'presume that the legislature used each word 
advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary 
and accepted meaning.' " Arredondo v. Avis Rem A Car Sys., 
Inc.. 2001 UT 29,«1 12, 24 P,3d 928 (citations omitted). We 
consider other methods of statutory construction only when a 
statute is ambiguous. [FN1] 
FN1. Even in construing ambiguous statutes, our focus remains 
on effectuating the legislative intent. See Iniermountam Slurry 
Seal v. Labor Comm'n. 2002 UT App 164^ 6, 48 P.3d 252 
("When doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or 
application of an act's provisions, an analysis of the act in its 
entirety should be undertaken and its provisions harmonized in 
accordance with the legislative intent and purpose."). 
The point is that use of the word "primary" should not be ignored. The 
legislative history of §31A-22-314(l) shows that the word "primary" is very intentional. 
Before 1998, this section had no exception to coverage if other insurance was available. In 
1998, two amendments passed. The first, chapter 325 of the Utah 1998 Session Laws, 
deleted the word "primary" but did not add any provisions relating to other insurance. 
Chapter 325 included the following coordination provision: 
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If this bill and 4th Substitute S.B. 76, [FN1] Insurance Law 
Changes, both pass, it is the intent of the Legislature that the 
amendments to Section 31A-22-314 in the 4th Substitute S.B. 
76, Insurance Law Changes, supersede the amendments to 
Section 31A-22-314 in this bill. 
Approved March 21, 1998 
Effective May 4, 1998 
[FN1] Laws 1998, c. 329, effective May 4, 1998. 
As shown in the footnote, S.B. 76 passed as chapter 329. Chapter 329 added 
the exception for other insurance but, unlike chapter 325, it did not delete the word 
"primary". Hence, §31 A-22-314(1) intentionally requires "primary" coverage unless there 
is other valid or collectible insurance coverage. 
What does the history teach us? Chapter 325 was apparently intended to 
remove the discrepancy between §31 A-22-314(1) and §41-12a-301(2)(a). If the matter had 
rested there, the code would merely have had redundant provisions that emphasized rental 
companies had no special treatment. Chapter 329 gave the rental companies special 
treatment, though. The question is whether the existence of "other insurance" was intended 
to eliminate the duty of coverage (an "escape" clause) or to make that duty secondary to the 
"other insurance". This lends added importance to the reinstatement of "primary" in 
connection with the special treatment. Without the word "primary", the intention to create 
an "escape" clause would be inescapable. 
If the legislature had intended to create an escape clause, it had a model for 
such language in §31A-22-303(2)(a)(iii) and (iv): 
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(2) (a) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage 
under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a) may: 
(iii) if the policy is issued to a person other than a motor vehicle 
business, limit the coverage afforded to a motor vehicle business 
or its officers, agents, or employees to the minimum limits under 
Section 31A-22-304, and to those instances when there is no 
other valid and collectible insurance with at least those limits, 
whether the other insurance is primary, excess, or contingent; 
and 
(iv) if issued to a motor vehicle business, restrict coverage 
afforded to anyone other than the motor vehicle business or its 
officers, agents, or employees to the minimum limits under 
Section 31A-22-304, and to those instances when there is no 
other valid and collectible insurance with at least those limits, 
whether the other insurance is primary, excess, or contingent. 
[Italics added] 
With two ready ways to clearly draft an escape clause, the legislature used 
neither. Instead, it focused on "primary coverage". This is instructive because saying that 
coverage is required to be "primary" when there is no other insurance is pointless 
redundancy. Whether the coverage is "primary" or not only matters if there is other 
insurance. The necessary nexus between "primary" and the existence of other insurance 
points to the meaning of the amendment. "Primary coverage" by the rental company is 
excused when there is other insurance. Secondary coverage is not excused. Rental 
companies are granted the benefit of being second in line. Although limited, this is still a 
substantial benefit and change from prior law. 
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POINT FOUR: 
The Coverage of Enterprise is Not Secondary to 
GEICO's Underinsured Motorist Coverage 
The concept of underinsured motorist coverage is the provision of 
additional coverage where there is an underinsured motor vehicle. §31 A-22-305(9)(a)(i). 
Since Enterprise is required to insure the vehicle, its liability should come ahead of 
GEICO's underinsured motorist coverage. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The relief sought by this appeal is to vacate the summary judgment granted 
to Enterprise and instruct the trial court to enter summary judgment that Zhang is entitled 
to $25,000 of liability coverage from Enterprise, secondary only to the primary coverage 
of American Commerce. 
Beiwei Li should be awarded his costs for this appeal. 
DATED this (f, K day of April, 2004. 
/ 
i ^^ *A 
IJ). Tanner, Jr.', 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
Beiwei Li 
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NO ADDENDUM IS REQUIRED UNDER URAP 24(A)(11) 
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